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NOTES
Can an Adult Be Compelled To Submit to a Blood
Transfusion Against His Religious Beliefs? The Implications
of John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston
The defendant was severely injured in an automobile accident and was
rushed to the plaintiff hospital. The attending physicians at the hospital deter-
mined that the defendant would die from a ruptured spleen unless an oper-
ation was performed, and even if operated upon, the defendant would die
unless a blood transfusion was administered. The defendant and her parents
were Jehovah's Witnesses and their religious belief forbade blood transfusions
The defendant, an adult, later claimed that she refused a blood transfusion,
but the attending physicians stated that in their opinion she was in shock and
incoherent and incompetent to make a judgment. The defendant's mother
strongly opposed the transfusion and signed a release that relieved the hospital
of any liability for malpractice because of failure to administer proper treat-
ment. A release was not signed by the defendant because of the seriousness of
her condition. After notice to the mother the plaintiff hospital made applica-
tion to a judge of the superior court for the appointment of a guardian who
would have the authority to consent to a life-saving blood transfusion for the
defendant At the hearing it was determined that no doctor could be found
who would perform the operation without also administering a transfusion.
The application was granted and a blood transfusion was administered. After
recovering from her injury, the defendant moved to have the order of the
superior court judge vacated, but the motion was denied. Despite the fact that
the case was technically moot, the Supreme Court of New Jersey consented
to hear it on the conviction that the public interest warranted a resolution of
the controversy Held, affirmed: An adult may be compelled to submit to a
blood transfusion, even though it is against his religious beliefs, when such
treatment is necessary to prevent his death. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital
v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 690 (1971).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Religious liberty is guaranteed to the American people by the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.4 The United States Supreme Court has
1 Jehovah's Witnesses base their belief on a biblical prohibition against eating blood.
"By a perpetual law for your generation and all you habitations, neither blood nor fat shall
you eat at all." Leviticus 3:17 (New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures). Also: "That
you abstain .. .from blood." Acts 15:29 (New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures).
See also Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATHOLIC LAWYER
212 (1964).
2N.J. REV. STAT. S 3A:22-1 (1953). This was an action by Kennedy Memorial Hos-
pital, as plaintiff, against the patient, who was unconscious and who required a blood trans-
fusion to prevent imminent death, and the patient's mother, who refused to consent to a
transfusion because of religious beliefs.
'Other jurisdictions have held that the public interest may justify a refusal to dismiss
an appeal as moot. See Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1185 (1941). See generally Note, Cases Moot
on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 772 (1955); Note, Emer-
gency Writ Issued Authorizing Blood Transfusions Against Adult Patient's Will, 39 N.Y.L.
REV. 706 (1964).
4U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of
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held, however, that this constitutional guarantee is limited in its scope. In the
first case in which the Court addressed itself to the free exercise clause of the
first amendment, the Court voiced the opinion that although the laws cannot
interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may interfere with
religious practices.' The state has an interest in preserving the general welfare
of its people,' and an individual's religious liberty will be limited when his
actions create a clear and present danger to this state interest.! Although this
clear and present danger test has been frequently used in freedom of speech
cases,' it has not emerged as the controlling test when applied to freedom of
religion cases. In determining what circumstances justify state interference with
religious practices, the approach of the Court has been to balance the indi-
vidual's right to religious freedom against the conflicting interest of society.'
As long as the individual does not interfere with the safety, morals, prosperity,
or personal rights of others, his right to engage in practices in furtherance of
his religious beliefs must be preserved. " If a state can accomplish its purpose
by any means other than treading upon an individual's religious observances,
it must seek such means.11 The state must make special provisions to relieve
religious liberty from restrictions imposed by generally legitimate govern-
mental regulations." There must be more than a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest to justify a substantial infringement of religious lib-
erty." Governmental regulations compelling action contrary to an individual's
conscience are considered serious interferences with religious liberty," and
courts have held that such interferences will not be tolerated unless there exists
a compelling state interest."
II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY WHEN OPPOSED
BY THE STATE'S INTEREST IN HEALTH
Compulsory medical treatment presents quite complex problems. It involves
constitutional questions of freedom of religion and conscience of the patient on
one hand, and the legal and ethical dilemma faced by the doctors and hospital
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... This prohibition is applicable to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).5 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
'McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957).7 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
8 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 542-43 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
'See Antieau, The Limitations of Religious Liberty, 18 FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 224
(1949).
'
0 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
'Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
*2Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
131d. at 406: "In this highly sensitive constitutional area only the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests give occasion for permissible limitations." See also In re
Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, vacated, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (refusal to serve
jury duty); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment compensa-
tion benefits to individual who refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (refusal to salute the American flag).
In all of the above cases the religious beliefs prevailed.
"
4 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 626 (1943).
"SState v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
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plus the state's interest in the health of its citizens on the other hand."0 As
early as 1903 it had been held that a parent, because of his religious beliefs,
could not refuse medical aid for his dying child.' When children are involved,
the courts have had little reservation in concluding that a parent's constitutional
freedom of religion must yield to the paramount interest of the state to act in
order to protect the welfare of a child and his right to survive. Most courts
base their authority to act on state juvenile statutes giving responsibility to the
state as parens patriae to care for infants within its jurisdiction and to protect
them from neglect and abuse.'8 Under such statutes courts have considered it
neglect when a parent because of his religious convictions refuses to permit a
blood transfusion necessary to save his child's life.' And, therefore, it would
be proper to appoint a guardian and to award custody to him for the limited
purpose of authorizing blood transfusions to save the life of a child." As the
United States Supreme Court announced in Prince v. Massachusetts: "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free,
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.""
It has been suggested that an individual's liberty to control himself and his
life encompasses the right to take his own life.2' Therefore, in those states in
which attempted suicide is lawful, the refusal of necessary medical attention
because of religious beliefs, whether equal to or less than attempted suicide,
must be considered lawful." Likewise, in those states in which attempted
suicide is recognized as a crime, when death is imminent a person may not be
allowed to refuse medical assistance because of religious beliefs. 4 But even in
states recognizing the individual's right to take his own life, the desire to end
one's life based upon his religious convictions must be sincere. This desire must
be a religiously commanded goal, and not just an unwarranted side effect of a
religious scruple." Thus, when an adult refuses to approve a blood transfusion,
but qualifies the refusal by saying that he will in no way resist a court order
permitting such a medical procedure, it may be inferred that the individual
does not sincerely wish to take his life, but rather he wishes to have his con-
"6Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 6 (1969). Contra, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (protection of society from contagious diseases); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (preservation of community morality); People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (use of drugs in furtherance of
religious beliefs); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Owens v. State,
60 Okla. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911) (medical aid to a dying child); Harden v. State, 188
Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948) (use of poisonous snakes in religious ceremonies).
'" People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
"8In New Jersey the pertinent juvenile statutes are N.J. REV. STAT. S 9:2-9 (1960)
and id. § 2A:4-2 (1952).
19Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
"
0 State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
21321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
2Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
" Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MiNN. L. REV. 48 (1954).
'Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
25 Id. at 1009.
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science cleared of any moral responsibility. In such cases a court order granting
a blood transfusion has been issued."0
There is authority, however, that a court does not have the power to order
compulsory medical treatment to a fully competent adult when there is no
danger to public health, welfare, or morals."7 Thus, when a competent adult
persistently refused to consent to a blood transfusion to save her life because
of her religious convictions as a Jehovah's Witness, knowing the consequences,
and having released the hospital and its doctors from any civil liability, the
court had no power to compel submission. In such a case there is no overriding
societal interest. Despite the fact that the individual's religious beliefs are con-
sidered by others to be foolish, unwise, or ridiculous, the court can neither
make a decision about what it thinks is best for the individual nor compel him
to act in a certain way when his conscience and religious convictions tell him
otherwise."
There are situations in which state interference is justified. If the adult is
incompetent, he is not in a mental condition to make any decision or to know
the consequences of his decision, and state interference may be justified." His
capacity to make a rational decision in such circumstances is no greater than
that of a child. In such instances the courts have assumed the responsibility of
guardianship for the adult, at least to the extent of authorizing treatment to
save his life." And, similarly, if a parent has no power to refuse action to save
his child's life, the husband has no power to refuse action to save his wife's
life.' Another consideration that has been accorded considerable weight by the
courts is whether the adult refusing treatment has any dependent minor chil-
dren who might become wards of the state if the parent should die. As parens
patriae the state has a right to protect a child from neglect during his minority.
Such protection includes forbidding parents to abandon their children. Thus,
refusal on the part of the parent to submit to medical treatment to save his
life may constitute abandonment. Therefore, in such situations orders for com-
pulsory medical treatment have been granted despite contrary religious views
held by the adult."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the state's status as parens
patriac extends to an unborn child. The court based the holding upon the
proposition that before birth the infant is a distinct entity, and, as such, the
law recognizes that rights he will enjoy when born can be violated before his
birth." In Raliegh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, in
21 Id.; United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
27In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
29205 N.E.2d at 442; Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 274
A.2d 832 (1971).
2"First Christian Church v. McReynolds, 194 Ore. 68, 241 P.2d 135 (1952); White v.
White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S.W. 508 (1917).
"
9 Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622,
254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1964).
32 331 F.2d at 1008.
32 Id.; United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Powell v. Columbian
Presbyterian Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965).
'Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
[Vol. 25
which a mother refused on religious grounds to consent to a blood transfusion
necessary to save her life as well as that of the child she was bearing, the court
held that a transfusion could be ordered. The court had no problem reaching
this decision with respect to the unborn infant. But the court refused to pass
upon the question of whether it was justified in compelling the adult to act
against her religious beliefs in order to save her life. The court concluded that
the welfare of the child was so intertwined with that of its mother that it was
not then necessary to make a distinction, and that granting an order requiring a
blood transfusion to save the lives of both the mother and the child was war-
ranted. The court reserved the question of whether there is judicial power to
order compulsory medical treatment regardless of an adult patient's objection
in the absence of any special circumstances."
I1. JOHN F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL V. HESTON
In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston " the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an adult may be compelled to submit to a blood transfusion,
even though it is against his religious beliefs, when such treatment is necessary
to prevent his death. The court in reaching its decision pointed out that the
important question posed by the case was whether the state should be allowed
to compel an adult to submit to treatment essential to save his life. ' The court
then proceeded to answer this question in favor of the state, basing its conclu-
sion upon two considerations. The first consideration was the state's interest in
sustaining the life of its people. The second consideration was the interest of a
hospital and its staff in maintaining a high professional standard consistent
with the principles of their profession.
The court refused to accept the idea that an individual's liberty includes the
right to take his own life. The court pointed out that state interference is al-
lowed to prevent suicides because the state has an interest in preserving the life
and health of its people. Rejecting the argument that there is a difference be-
tween actively seeking death and passively submitting to it, the court, by
analogy, reasoned that if a state may interfere to prevent a suicide, then it may
interfere to compel a patient to submit to life-saving medical treatment. The
court concluded that unless the medical treatment itself involved substantial
risk to the patient, the state's interest in sustaining life in such circumstances
was no different than its interest in preventing suicide. Furthermore, the court
said that even if the patient's refusal to submit to the necessary treatment were
based on religious convictions, the state would still be justified in interfering.
Basing this opinion upon Reynolds v. United States," the court observed that
an individual's religious beliefs may be absolute and free from governmental
regulation, but practices in furtherance of such beliefs are not absolute and
must be balanced with the state's interest. When the state's interest in sustaining
Id. at 538.
58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
"'See Note, Constitutional Law--Religion---Court Authorization of Blood Transfusion
to Patient Whose Religious Beliefs Prohibit the Acceptance of Blood Violates his Freedom
of Religion, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 190 (1965).
-898 U.S. 145 (1878).
NOTES19711
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life is involved, governmental restraint on religious practices would be justi-
fied."1
The interest of the state in the preservation of life was not the only basis
for the court's decision. Also considered by the court was the plight of the hos-
pital and its staff when faced with such a situation. The court noted that the
medical profession is dedicated to the preservation of life. Failure on their part
to do everything possible to save a life would amount to malpractice. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that a hospital and its staff should not be burdened
with the problems of deciding the sincerity of the patient's desire to die or the
patient's competency to make such a decision. Nor should they be required to
decide whether the release tendered by the patient or a member of his family
would protect them from civil liability. In these situations in which the hospital
is involuntarily entrusted with such problems the court found that the burden
should be shifted to a judicial body. If time permits, application to a court
should be made. And, if the court finds that a transfusion is necessary to save
the life of the patient, the hospital and its staff will be permitted to admin-
ister the transfusion. The court concluded: "The solution sides with life, the
conservation of which is, we think, a matter of state interest. '"4"
The court expressed its holding in a very limited manner by saying that
under the particular circumstances of the case a blood transfusion was war-
ranted. However, it appears that the effect of the decision will be to permit
hospitals to administer compulsory medical treatment to a patient if there is
no risk of death from the treatment itself and if death is imminent, regardless
of the patient's religious beliefs. To do otherwise, according to the court, would
be contrary to the interest of the state in the preservation of life and would
require doctors to shun their professional standards. However, the court quali-
fied its holding by requiring that application be made to a court for the ap-
pointment of a guardian for the patient if time permits. Such a qualification
leaves open the question of what a doctor should do when there is no time to
go through such a procedure. The language in the case seems to indicate that
in such a situation the doctor would be justified in administering the treat-
ment without court approval.
The social desirability of the court's objective cannot be questioned. But in
reaching its decision, the court failed to deal with the issue of why there was
such a compelling state interest in preserving life that the individual's constitu-
tional freedom of religious liberty could be overriden. In past cases state in-
terests have justified interference when the patient was incompetent to make
rational decisions about medical treatment or when he had a minor dependent
child who would become a ward of the state. Other cases have refused to allow
state interference when neither of these two circumstancs were present. In such
cases the courts have held that it was improper for them to attempt to decide
what course of action was best for the individual.41 It is unclear whether the
court in Kennedy Hospital considered these circumstances in finding a compel-
" Id. at 167.
40 279 A.2d at 673.
"'In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Il. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965).
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